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be built into the declining balance method and need not be considered by
the taxpayer.12
The Hertz Corporation has applied for and been granted certiorari
in the United States Supreme Court. 13
 It is submitted that the Third Cir-
cuit's interpretation of useful life could have been better substantiated by
consideration of the fundamental concept of depreciation. The depreciation
deduction should effect the distribution of the cost of a tangible capital
asset over its estimated useful life in a systematic and rational manner.
The deduction should seek to set off the cost of an asset against the income
produced by it during its life. Actual physical life of an asset, if different
from the holding period of the taxpayer, should be irrelevant.
The ability of the taxpayer to depreciate the asset below a reasonable
salvage value is of great importance as a capital gain tax would be paid
on any gain arising from the sale of the asset while depreciation is charged
against ordinary income. The Supreme Court's problem in this issue
will be to weigh the importance of the capital gain to the taxpayer on the
sale of the depreciated property against the need for additional tax revenue.
Whatever the final decision, it is probable that Congress has not spoken
its last word on the subject.
ALLAN B. SOLOMON
United States Arbitration Act—Stay of Proceedings—Declaration of
National Law—Fraud as an Arbitrable Issue.—Robert Lawrence Co.,
Inc. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.'—A Massachusetts buyer brought an
action for damages in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, jurisdiction being grounded on diversity of citizen-
ship, for alleged fraud in the inducement of a purchase agreement requiring
interstate shipment of goods. The disputed contract, made in New York
with a New York seller, contained an arbitration clause covering "any com-
plaint, controversy, or question which may arise." The defendant seller
moved to stay the legal proceedings pending arbitration, relying on § 3 of
the United States Arbitration Act. 2 The District Court denied the motion,
12 Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (1954) which in essence says that
salvage value is not applicable because at the expiration of the useful life there remains
an undepreciated balance which represents salvage value; Sen. Rep. No, 1622, 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 203 (1954) which in substance states that the limitation of a three
year life was placed on the declining method so that the asset could not be completely
depredated in the year of purchase.
13 361 U.S. 811 (1959).
1
 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted 28 U.S.L. Week 3259 (1960).
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958). The legislation was first enacted in 1925; 43 Stat. 883
(1925), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1946). It was enacted into positive law by Act, July 30,
1947, c. 392, 61 Stat. 670, without changing any of its provisions and designated
officially as Title 9 U.S.C.
The heart of the Act is contained in §§ 2, 3, 4. § 2 makes "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable" written provisions for arbitration in contracts involving interstate com-
merce and maritime transactions; § 3 provides for a stay of action in federal courts
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holding there could be no finding of an agreement to arbitrate until it was
judicially resolved whether there was fraud in the inception of the contract
as alleged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
HELD: § 2 of the Arbitration Act declaring arbitration agreements affect-
ing commerce or maritime affairs "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" is a
declaration of national law equally applicable in state or federal courts, and
questions as to validity and interpretation of arbitration agreements are
substantive questions governed by federal rather than state laws. § 2
is to be construed as treating an agreement to arbitrate as a separable part
of the contract. The arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass the
issue of fraud in inducement, and since there was no allegation that the
clause itself had been induced by fraud, arbitration must be had.
The court purports to answer questions left open by the Supreme Court
in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc.; 3 the "critical issue" for
determination in the instant case being whether federal law, i.e. the rules
fashioned by the federal courts under authorization of the United States
Arbitration Act, or local law governs with respect to the validity and inter-
pretation of the arbitration clause. The conclusion requiring the application
of federal law is based primarily upon a determination that Congress in-
tended to create a new body of substantive law relative to arbitration agree-
ments affecting interstate commerce or maritime transactions' It is especially
true where the Act makes agreements to arbitrate "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable;" thus the Act creates federal rights which arise out of the ex-
ercise by the Congress of its constitutional power to regulate commerce,
thereby precluding consideration in diversity cases of serious constitutional
questions which might present themselves under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins.5 Such a finding has hitherto never been precisely determined. 6
of issues referable to arbitration under those contracts; and { 4 provides motion pro-
ceedings to obtain a general order against a recalcitrant party to proceed to arbitration
in compliance with the agreement.
a 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
4 See statements to this effect in Local 205, United Electrical Radio & Machine
Workers of America v. General Electric Company, 233 F.2d 85, 96 (1st Cir. 1956),
aff'd, 353 U.S. 547 (1957), (where jurisdiction was grounded on § 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act [LMRA, 61 Stat. 156 (1947)] holding that federal substantive law
applies not only to § 301 but also to Arbitration Act ; however, the court's conclusions
respecting the application of the Arbitration Act were later implicitly overruled) ;
Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364 (D. Neb. 1948), (in-
dicating that Congress has occupied the field where arbitration clause involves commerce
or maritime matters) ; Jackson v. Kentucky River Mills, 65 F. Supp. 601, 603 (E.D.
Ky. 1946), aff'd, 206 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953),
(holding that within the scope of § 2 [maritime, commerce] federal rather than state
law is applicable). See also, Cox, Grievance Arbitration In The Federal Courts, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 591, 598 n.24 (1954) ; Sturges, Some Confusing Matters Relating To
Arbitration Under The United States Arbitration Act, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 580
(1953).
5 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ; see, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410 (1953).
6 Sturges; supra note 4; Kochery, The Enforcement Of Arbitration Agreements
In The Federal Courts: Erie v. Tompkins, 39 Cornell. L.Q. 74, 78 (1953).
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Formerly, the determination by the federal courts in diversity cases as
to whether to apply local state law which might adhere to the common law
rule of revocability and unenforceability of arbitration agreements, 7 or to
apply the Arbitration Act appeared to depend upon the courts' characteriza-
tion of the provisions of the Act as either "procedural and remedial" with
the law of the forum controlling, or "substantive" in which case the law of
the state would be applicable. 8 There appears to have been no comparable
problem in the cases construing arbitration clauses in contracts entered into
under specific federal statutes other than the Arbitration Act, the federal
rule being almost automatically applied .° Prior to the decision in Erie, it
was the prevailing rule that the means of enforcing an arbitration agree-
ment properly fell in the category of remedy or procedure.'° Subsequent to
Erie, in diversity actions involving no federal question, the substantive law
of the state in which the court sits must be applied." Similarly, although
remedial or procedural issues are for the forum's own law, questions other-
wise classified ias questions of remedy and procedure when they may "sub-
stantially affect the outcome" of the litigation must be determined in a
diversity case according to state law.' 2 Bernhardt declared that the Arbi-
tration Act touched on substantive rights which Erie held were governed by
local law, rather than a mere form of procedure within the power of the
federal courts or Congress to prescribe. Thus, the procedure-substance di-
chotomy which has produced so much confusion in the federal courtsla
appeared resolved with respect to the enforceability" of an arbitration agree-
ment, namely that the enforceability of an arbitration agremeent apart
from the Arbitration Act "substantially affects the cause of action created
by the State." Bernhardt also settled the question as to whether the pro-
7 Vynior's Case 8 Co. Rep. 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (1609). Dictum enunciated
by Lord Coke in 1609 to the effect that agreements for arbitration were specifically
unenforceable, whereby the courts for two hundred and thirty-five years had sanctioned
and attached the legal consequences of irrevocability to arbitration agreements.
8
 For a comprehensive examination of the substance-procedure dichotomy, see,
Sturges, supra note 4, at 590-596; Kochery, supra note 6, at 76-78.
9 Boston & Maine Transp. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n. 106 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass.
1952) ; Voutrey v. General Backing Co., 39 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Pa. 1941). Evolutionary
development with respect to arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements
under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act reaches its culmination in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), where the court held that § 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act without the aid of the Arbitration Act authorized specific performance
of arbitration agreements, and that federal substantive Jaw is applicable under § 301.
This fashioning of federal substantive law for the purpose of enforcing a federal act
appears analogous to the instant case.
10
 E.g., California Prune & Apricot Growers' Ass'n v. Catz American Co., 60 F.2d
788 (9th Cir. 1932).
11 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, supra note 5.
12 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
13 Sturges, op. cit. supra note 4; Kochery, op. cit. supra note 6.
14 The court in the instant case did not consider any tenable distinction existing
between the enforceability of an arbitration agreement and questions of validity and
interpretation of arbitration agreements with respect to their substantive effect. But see,
e.g., The Silverbrook, 18 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1927).
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visions of all sections of the Act extended to arbitration agreements covering
controversies in addition to those arising out of "maritime transactions" or
"commerce", concluding that the stay of proceedings provided in § 3 of the
Arbitration Act reaches only those contracts covered by §§ 1 and 2, thereby
narrowing the breadth of the Act to interstate commerce and admiralty
matters." The court in Bernhardt felt that the application of § 3 to di-
versity cases which do not involve commerce or maritime matters would
raise the question as to whether under the Erie doctrine Congress has the
constitutional authority to make the federal Act applicable to such cases."
Since the Bernhardt contract did not come within the two categories enumer-
ated in the Arbitration Act, the court, fearing a head-on collision with Erie,
left undetermined the questions whether in a diversity case involving com-
merce or maritime matters the newly characterized substantive feature of
§ 3 would preclude other than state law governing, or whether in its de-
termination of the exclusiveness of the Act to commerce or maritime matters
it intended to indicate the exercise of a congressional intent to create federal
substantive law, under the commerce clause, applicable to arbitration agree-
ments. The court's focus in Bernhardt on the possible substantive importance
of arbitration might well lead to the conclusion that Congress intended the
United States Arbitration Act to be applicable in state courts in cases in-
volving arbitration agreements falling within the purview of the Act. 17
An interpretation of the federal arbitration statute which involves the
crucial problem of trying to determine whether a less than definitive exposi-
tion of law enumerated in the form of an act to require arbitration be given
national substantive meaning by the courts necessarily hinges upon the
judicial determination of a sufficient legislative intent that such exclusive
meaning be given. The inquiry into the intent of Congress requires the
courts to evaluate the necessity for federal law of national scope in light of
state jurisdiction over arbitration agreements. Must Congress in the exercise
of its vast powers under the Commerce clause, before it is free to employ
the federal court system for the effectuation of the Arbitration Act, go the
full length of displacing state substantive law? The process of evolution in
the field of federal arbitration compels an affirmative response. Basically the
result reached in the instant case merely flows as part of that evolutionary
process favoring judicial recognition of arbitration agreements being made
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable.
DENNIS L. DITELBERG
16 Prior to this determination a majority of courts had held that § 3 and other
enforcement provisions of the Act were not limited by § 2 relating to commerce and
admiralty, but that any arbitration agreement could be enforced if the federal court
17 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., supra note 3, at 202-205; Cox,
Cir. 1944).
16 Sturges, op. cit. supra note 4; Kochery, op. cit. supra note 6.
17 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., supra note 2, at 202-205; Cox,
op. cit. supra note 4; see statements to this effect in the instant case at 40.5-406.
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